Lebanon War 2.1

The failure of diplomacy

The next version of the war follows from deficiencies in the first

"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I KNOW THE question on the minds of many people is 'What will be considered a victory in the present confrontation in the Middle East?'", Shimon Peres, Israel's Vice Prime Minister, said in a talk at the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations on July 31.

Mr. Peres gave a five-fold answer. Victory, he said, would be identifiable when Hezbollah permanently vacates Lebanon's southern border; when Israel's kidnapped soldiers are returned; when the rockets cease being launched at Israel; when Hezbollah is prevented from re-arming; and, finally, when Lebanon is freed from the control of Hezbollah.

Judging by that characterization, Israel was not victorious. But neither, we believe, did Israel lose the war.

WHATEVER ERRORS ISRAEL MADE IN THE prosecution of the war effort - and those will certainly be revealed by Israel's own investigation - the failure to attain victory is, in large part, attributable to the achievement of the diplomats.

The ones - like the French - who, keen to stop Israel from being successful on the battlefield, promised to bring tranquility to the region with a new United Nations resolution and a vigorous and enhanced peacekeeping force.

Both, of course, have so far proven not only ineffectual but harmful. Instead of the 30,000 troops to be stationed in southern Lebanon, there is - and likely will remain - the same inept UNIFIL soldiers. Instead of leading the Security Council authorized 15,000-strong force, France is sending some 200 (maybe 400) engineers.

Instead of disarming Hezbollah - a requirement left vague by UN Resolution 1701 - one has a Hezbollah which refuses to disarm and which no one - certainly not the French - is interested in disarming.

While disarming is out of the question, however, re-arming is not. That will continue from the same Syrian and Iranian sources as before.

The hostages have not been returned.

THE RESULT, THEREFORE, IS THAT diplomacy has provided the foundation for a new outbreak of fighting.

As we noted in an editorial in the last issue, Israel has not done well in converting battlefield victories into poltical victories.

This recent Lebanon War is version 2.1 of the 1982 Lebanon War. In that campaign, Israel ousted PLO terrorists from Lebanon but eventually failed to convert that triumph into a political victory.

With the dangerous shadow of Iran's maniacal Ahmadinejad looming over the region, the dangers for Israel remain existential. The defeat of Israel's uncompromising enemies will occur, but doing so has only been made more difficult by the predictably futile effort of do-gooders who wish Israel no good and her enemies no harm.